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English health policy has moved towards establishing specialist multi-disciplinary teams to care for
patients suffering rare or particularly complex conditions. But the healthcare resource groups (HRGs),
which form the basis of the prospective payment system for hospitals, do not explicitly account for
specialist treatment. There is a risk, then, that hospitals in which specialist teams are based might be
ﬁnancially disadvantaged if patients requiring specialised care are more expensive to treat than others
allocated to the same HRG. To assess this we estimate the additional costs associated with receipt of
specialised care. We analyse costs for 12,154,599 patients treated in 163 English hospitals in ﬁscal year
2008/09 according to the type of specialised care received, if any. We account for the distributional
features of patient cost data, and estimate ordinary least squares and generalised linear regression
models with random effects to isolate what inﬂuence the hospital itself has on costs. We ﬁnd that, for
nineteen types of specialised care, patients do not have higher costs than others allocated to the same
HRG. However, costs are higher if a patient has cancer, spinal, neurosciences, cystic ﬁbrosis, children’s,
rheumatology, colorectal or orthopaedic specialised services. Hospitals might be paid a surcharge for
providing these forms of specialised care. We also ﬁnd substantial variation in the average cost of
treatment across the hospital sector, due neither to the provision of specialised care nor to other char-
acteristics of each hospital’s patients.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
The past few years have seen two forms of specialisation being
promoted in the English health system. The ﬁrst takes the form of
what Skinner termed “focused factories”, whereby organizations
concentrate on a limited range of activity (Skinner, 1974). Examples
in the United States include Ambulatory Care Centres and specialist
orthopaedic, cardiac or general surgery hospitals (Barro, Huckman,
& Kessler, 2006; Schneider et al., 2008) and, in England, treatment
centres dedicated to the delivery of speciﬁc treatment such as hip
and knee replacement or cataract removal (Department of Health,
2002). There are two main attractions of such focused operations.
First, by concentrating on speciﬁc procedures, such organizations
may be able to attract sufﬁcient volumes of patients to beneﬁt from
economies of scale (Schneider et al., 2008; Zwanziger, Melnick, &
Simonson, 1996). Second, these organizations may be better able
to guarantee that treatment will take place as planned simply
because resources are dedicated to the purpose. They, therefore,e UN, Viale Aventino 1, Rome
silvio.daidone@gmail.com
4.
C-ND license.avoid competition for resources witnessed in general hospitals
(Harris, 1977) where, in the face of capacity constraints, patients
admitted as emergencies might be prioritised ahead of others (The
Royal College of Surgeons of England, 2007).
But this organizational set-up has its detractors, the main
argument being that they focus on less complex patients (Barro
et al., 2006; Street, Sivey, Mason, Miraldo, & Siciliani, 2010). There
may be sound clinical grounds for this, if dedicated units lack the
back-up facilities required should problems arise. But critics argue
that these organizations are “cream skimming” for ﬁnancial rea-
sons, noting that most US specialist hospitals are for-proﬁt and
physician owned. Although the number of specialist hospitals in
the United States grew from 29 in 1990 to 91 in 2005 the US gov-
ernment imposed a moratorium on further development, con-
cerned primarily that such hospitals were specializing merely on
the most proﬁtable procedures (Schneider et al., 2008; Shactman,
2005).
Rather than “cream skimming”, the second strand of English
specialisation policy has created the potential for “adverse selec-
tion” of more complex patients at specialist centres. This policy
involves establishing specialist multidisciplinary teams to care for
patients suffering rare conditions, the idea being that the specialist
team sees sufﬁcient numbers of such patients to be able tomaintain
expertise and to deliver best outcomes (Smith, 2002). This
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“specialised care” being a service that requires a planning popula-
tion of more than one million people (NHS Specialised Services,
2010c). Specialised care may also be required if the condition is
particularly severe, if the patient suffers other serious underlying
problems, or to correct complications following a procedure.
The deﬁnition implies that a specialised service should be pro-
vided only by those hospitals with the necessary teams and infra-
structure. This requirement is not directly regulated by the English
Department of Health (DoH), with all NHS hospitals allowed to
provide any type of service. Instead the DoH deﬁnes those hospitals
with the requisite teams as eligible for additional funding related to
the provision of specialised care (Department of Health, 2006).
After establishing eligibility, the issue arises as to how to pay for
specialised care.
As in many countries, English hospitals are funded under a pro-
spective payment system that links a hospital’s income to the
number and casemix of patients treated (Busse, Geissler, Quentin, &
Wiley, 2011). Payments are deﬁned in terms of the healthcare
resource group (HRG e the English version of diagnosis related
groups) to which each patient is allocated. Allocation is based on
which (if any) procedures are received, primary diagnosis, age and
level of complications (Mason, Ward, & Street, 2011). The current
version, known as HRG4, contains some 1400 groups which are
intended to be clinically similar and resource homogeneous. But
inevitably each HRG combines patients with below and above
average costs. This will not create a funding problem as long as
within-HRG variation in costs is random across hospitals. But vari-
ation may be systematic if it is related to characteristics of patients
that have not been taken explicitly into account in constructing
HRGs. One such characteristic is whether or not patients need spe-
cialised care. This may make them more expensive to treat than
otherwise similar patients allocated to the same HRG. Moreover, by
virtue of their care requirements, such patientswill be concentrated
in those hospitals with the requisite specialist team. The danger is
that these hospitals will be underfunded if HRGs fail to account
accurately for the differential care requirements of such patients.
There are two options to deal with the problem. The ﬁrst would
be to subdivide HRGs according to whether or not specialised care
is provided, in much the same way that groups are divided into
severity levels, as in France (Or & Bellanger, 2011), or according to
the presence of complications and comorbidities (Kobel, Thuilliez,
Bellanger, & Pfeiffer, 2011). A slight drawback of this approach is
that because patients receiving specialised care are potentially
distributed across all HRGs the number of categories might double,
undermining the desirable feature of a limited number of cate-
gories (Fetter, Shin, & Freeman, 1980; Kobel et al., 2011). More
pertinently, this option also presumes that patients requiring spe-
cialised care are indeed more costly to care for than other patients
allocated to the same HRG, a presumption that must be established
empirically.
The second option would be to make an additional surcharge
over and above the prospective price if there is evidence that the
receipt of specialised care does increase costs relative to other pa-
tients in the same payment category. Countries including Australia,
France, Germany, Italy and the US have adopted this type of
approach to deal with complexity or specialisation (Ettelt,
Thomson, Nolte, & Mays, 2006; Rosko & Carpenter, 1994;
Scheller-Kreinsen, Quentin, & Busse, 2011).
In what follows we evaluate whether patients that receive
specialised care are more costly to care for than others in the same
HRG. The evaluation involves ﬁrst identifying whether or not a
patient received specialised care and, if so, what of type specialised
care this was. Specialised care is identiﬁed using the English Spe-
cialised Services National Deﬁnition Sets (SSNDS), which have beenarrived at by clinicians, managers, coding staff, commissioners and
patient representatives to support the commissioning of speci-
alised services for patients with rare or complex conditions (NHS
Specialised Services, 2010c). The deﬁnitions are based on diag-
nosis or procedure codes which, if present in the patient’s medical
record, indicate that the patient received specialised care. Having
identiﬁed which patients received specialised care, we then
compare treatment costs for patients allocated to the same HRG
who did and did not receive specialised care. Observed costs may
be partly attributable to inefﬁcient resource use on the part of the
hospital itself so in the comparisons we allow for these possible
hospital effects. Finally we assess hospitals in terms of their average
costs, having controlled for their patient casemix, and assess
whether these costs are related to the proportion of specialised
activity undertaken.
In the next section we outline our empirical strategy to inves-
tigate the extent to which variations in observed treatment costs
are explained, ﬁrstly, by whether or not a patient received a spe-
cialised service and, secondly, by the hospital in which care is
provided. Then we provide a presentation of the data and some
descriptive statistics, followed by results. We draw conclusions in
the ﬁnal section.
Empirical model
Our empirical approach builds on the literature that examines
hospital costs using patient-level data, a primary purpose being to
identify the relative costs of each hospital (Bradford, Kleit, Krousel-
Wood, & Re, 2001; Dormont & Milcent, 2004, 2005; Kessler &
McClellan, 2002; Laudicella, Olsen, & Street, 2010; McClellan,
1997; Olsen & Street, 2008). All of these analyses focus on a
particular subset of hospital patients. Instead we consider the
whole population of patients admitted to English hospitals. There
are two advantages to this. First, we are able to derive an estimate
of relative cost performance for each hospital as a whole, rather
than merely a subset of its activity. Second, because we consider all
costs and all activities this estimate is less likely to be contaminated
by decisions about how shared costs are allocated across subsets of
activity. We ﬁrst explain how costs are calculated before setting out
our empirical model.
Constructing patient costs
All English hospitals are required to report their activity and
costs annually to the DoH applying a standard top-down costing
methodology to produce costs for patients allocated to each HRG in
each of their departments (Department of Health, 2008b). The NHS
Costing Manual sets out rules to ensure that costs are matched as
closely as possible to the services that generate them and that
maximise direct attribution of costs in preference to apportion-
ment. Costs are calculated on a full absorption basis, meaning that
they should reﬂect the full cost of the service delivered and have to
reconcile back to the general ledger. Instructions are provided
about which costs should be directly attributable, either to indi-
vidual patients or departments (e.g. drugs, dressings, surgical im-
plants, clinical and nursing staff); indirect costs shared across
patients in different departments or wards, which can usually be
attributed on an activity basis (e.g. laundry, maintenance staff); and
general overheads which are not related to activity levels in any
given year (e.g. rent and rates, senior management). According to
these instructions, total hospital costs are progressively cascaded
down to treatment and support services (theatres, pharmacy,
radiology, pathology, etc), to departments (general surgery, general
medicine, obstetrics, etc), to wards, and then to patients according
to the HRG in which they are categorised.
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each hospital reports annually to the DoH (Department of Health,
2012). For patients allocated to the same HRG, hospitals report
costs according to whether the patient was admitted as an emer-
gency (non-elective) or following referral, usually from their gen-
eral practitioner (elective). Further, for elective patients in the same
HRG, hospitals separately report costs for those treated on a day
case basis and those treated as inpatients. Per diem costs are also
reported for patients that stay in hospital beyond HRG speciﬁc
length of stay trimpoints.
We map these costs to each patient according to the hospital
and department inwhich they were treated, the HRG towhich they
were allocated, their admission type, and their length of stay, by
applying the process described in the ﬁrst Appendix of the sup-
plementary material. This process generates costs that are the most
speciﬁc to an individual patient that can be achieved given the top-
down cost allocation methods that are used by English hospitals.
In our analyses, all costs reported by hospitals are adjusted by
the market forces factor (MFF), this being an index of geographical
variation in the prices of land, buildings, and labour (Department of
Health, 2008a), designed to account for unavoidable differences in
factor prices incurred by different hospitals.
Clear differences in costs exist between patients who do and do
not receive specialised care, amounting on average to £1884 and
£1385 respectively. Other than the receipt of specialised care, the
most obvious reasons that patients have different costs are that
they have different care requirements and that they are treated in
different hospitals. Our analysis is designed to isolate these
inﬂuences.
Model speciﬁcations
The main reason that patients have different costs is that they
have different care requirements and, consequently, receive very
diverse types of treatment, as is recognised in the HRG-based
payment system. However, it is unfeasible to introduce dummy
variables for all HRGs as there are too many e the English system
comprises 1400 groups (Mason et al., 2011). We therefore stan-
dardise each patient’s cost by themean cost of all patients allocated
to the same HRG. Thus our dependent variable is deﬁned as the
patient’s cost relative to the average cost of patients in the same
HRG: ~Cik ¼ Cihk=bCh where Cihk is the cost of patient i in HRG h in
hospital k and bCh is the national average cost of all patients allo-
cated to HRG h.
We take account of the clustering of patients within hospitals by
estimating a random effects model. Our preference for the RE
rather than ﬁxed effects (FE) speciﬁcation has been driven by some
practical issues. Firstly, the Hausman test rejected the null hy-
pothesis of no systematic difference between FE and RE. Secondly,
hospital effects are predicted differently after estimation and this
divergence may bring about conﬂicting policy interpretations. In
the RE framework, hospital effects are retrieved from the under-
lying distribution of the random variable, combining prior infor-
mation about the parameter values with the information available
from the data to obtain posterior means (Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh,
2009). When the number of patients within a hospital is relatively
small, the posterior mean corresponds to the mean of the prior, an
attractive property known as “shrinkage towards the mean”.
Finally, the RE speciﬁcation can be easily applied to Generalised
Linear Models (GLM) (McCulagh & Nelder, 1989). The resulting
framework is known as Generalised Linear Mixed Models (GLMM)
(McCulloch, 2003), for which the FE approach does not lead to an
equivalent straightforward generalisation.
We regress the standardised cost against a set of specialised care
markers (S), these corresponding to the type of specialised care asdeﬁned in the Specialised Services National Deﬁnition Sets. These
markers enter as dummy variables, taking the value of 1 if the
patient is recorded as having any of the diagnoses or procedures
listed in the relevant deﬁnition set. The model is speciﬁed as:
~Cik ¼ fþ
XN
n¼1
bnSnik þ uk þ vik (1)
The model includes a random hospital effect uk and a random
error term, vik, for the ith patient using the nth specialised service S,
within the kth hospital (assumed to have zero mean and constant
variance sv). The b’s are the parameters of interest: if positive and
signiﬁcant, a patient with the specialist care marker has higher
costs than do other patients allocated to the same HRG. In order to
get a more easily interpretable measure like the percentage in-
crease, g, we need to compute the marginal mean for both speci-
alised and unspecialised services, so that
gn ¼
E

~Ci
Sn ¼ 1; S

 E

~Ci
Sn ¼ 0; S

E

~Ci
Sn ¼ 0; S
 *100 (2)
In a linear OLS the coefﬁcients on specialised markers, the b’s,
represent the difference in standardised costs between specialised
and unspecialised services. Therefore Equation (2) boils down to
bn
E

~Ci
Sn ¼ 0; S
*100
The uk in Equation (1) is the random effect. This captures the
effect of the hospital on the cost of any particular patient treated in
the hospital over and above the average cost of the HRG and the
other explanatory variables included in the model (here, whether
andwhat type of specialised care the patient received). The random
effects, then, can be thought as the relative hospital performance in
controlling costs. However, this interpretation is conditional upon
having properly accounted for other factors that might explain
variation in patient costs.
Equation (1) includes only the specialised care markers to
explain why the costs of any individual patient might differ from
the costs of other patients allocated to the same HRG. But within
each HRG, some hospitals might attract more complex patients
with more diagnostic problems. If there were systematic differ-
ences across hospitals in the type of patients treated within each
particular HRG, the estimated random effects would provide an
imperfect measure of relative hospital performance. If this is not
taken into account the hospital will appear to have higher costs
than it should have given the (inaccurately measured) proﬁle of the
patients that it treats.
The solution is to assess the extent to which patient character-
istics, over and above whether they have received specialised ser-
vices, explain costs. To this end, we include a set (m ¼ 1.M) of
additional risk-adjustment variables (X) describing each patient.
We specify these variables in the next section. The risk-adjusted
model takes the form:
~Cik ¼ fþ
XN
n¼1
bnSnik þ
XM
m¼1
gmXmi þ uk þ vik (3)
The random effect in this equation captures the hospital’s in-
ﬂuence on costs over and above the inﬂuence of all the other
patient-level variables accounted for in the model. Consequently
the cost of a typical patient in a hospital with a relatively large
random effect is higher than the cost of a comparable patient
treated in a hospital with a lower random effect.
Table 1
Number of patients identiﬁed as receiving specialised care, deﬁned for each Speci-
alised Services National Deﬁnition Set (SSNDS).
SSNDS # SSNDS #
No spec. serv. 10,901,844 Dermatology 10,790
Cancer 14,035 Rheumatology 358
Blood & marrow transplantation 1050 Endocrinology 7028
Haemophilia 146 Respiratory 71,824
Women 22,551 Vascular diseases 801
Spinal 2167 Pain management 753
Neurosciences 23,848 Ear surgery 1704
Cystic ﬁbrosis 91,868 Colorectal 6838
Renal 360,957 Orthopaedic 3671
Intestinal failure 2380 Morbid obesity 7905
Cardiology & cardiac surgery 89,127 Metabolic disorders 3182
Cleft lip & palate 222,939 Ophthalmology 6345
Infectious diseases 2203 Haemoglobinopathy 146,403
Liver, biliary & pancreatic 14,807 >1 spec. serv. 32,311
Children 104,764 Total 12,154,599
0
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40
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80
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0
20
40
60
80
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Fig. 1. Distribution of specialised activity among providers.
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that hospital cost data are highly skewedwith a long right-hand tail
(Basu & Rathouz, 2005; Beeuwkes Buntin & Zaslavsky, 2004;
Manning & Mullahy, 2001). Usual OLS methods may yield biased
and/or less precise estimates of means and marginal effects, since
results may not be robust to tail problems. Therefore in selecting
our estimationmodel we compare OLSwith: i) OLS for log or square
root transformed costs; ii) GLM; and iii) Finite Mixture Models
(FMM).
Data issues and descriptive statistics
We analyse the hospital episode statistics (HES) for patients
discharged from each English NHS acute hospital during the
ﬁnancial year 2008/9. HES comprise individual patient records
deﬁned as a Finished Consultant Episode (episode) about every
NHS patient admitted to hospital in England. Episodes measure the
time patients spend under the care of a particular consultant. We
link the episodes for each patient in order to capture information
about the full course of hospital treatment (Castelli, Laudicella, &
Street, 2008). Our analytical sample consists of 12,154,599 pa-
tients treated in 163 hospitals. The selection of the sample is
described in detail in the supporting material.
We look at the information in each patient’s medical record to
ascertain whether or not specialised care was received, as deﬁned
by the Specialised Services National Deﬁnition Sets (SSNDS) (NHS
Specialised Services, 2010c). The third edition contains 34 deﬁni-
tion sets each of which identiﬁes a set of diagnoses and procedures
that are deemed either deﬁnitively or potentially specialised using
the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases (ICD), version 10, and
the OPCS Classiﬁcation of Interventions and Procedures, version
4.5. We construct a dummy variable for each deﬁnition set, taking a
value of 1 if any one of the deﬁnitive specialised codes appears in
the patient’s medical record. For seven deﬁnition sets, no deﬁnitive
codes are provided because additional criteria must be considered
in determining whether specialised care is required (for example
see NHS Specialised Services (2010a)), so these deﬁnition sets are
excluded from the analysis. Thus, we construct 27 dummy variables
indicating which type of specialised care has been received.We add
an additional condition that patients were treated at a hospital
deemed by the Department of Health to have the necessary team
and infrastructure to provide specialised care and, therefore, to be
deemed eligible for specialised funding. We perform a sensitivity
analysis that relaxes this latter condition.
In 2008/9, for approximately 1.5 m patients it was indicated that
some kind of specialised service was delivered as part of the
treatment package. Table 1 reports the number of patients who
received each type of specialised services, showing, for instance,
that more than 360,000 patients received specialised renal services
as deﬁned in the renal SSNDS (NHS Specialised Services, 2010b).
Some 32,000 patients received more than one of the broad types of
specialised service.
Consider the distribution of specialised services among hospi-
tals. Fig. 1 shows the proportion of each hospital’s patients that
received specialised services (the bar height) and the proportions
that were eligible (dark) or not (white) for additional payment. As
would be expected, most specialised care is provided by those
hospitals classiﬁed by the Department of Health as eligible pro-
viders. Nonetheless, a non-trivial portion of specialised services is
provided by hospitals that are not deemed eligible for additional
funding for these particular services.
Patient characteristics are derived from information contained
in their medical record. In Table 2 we report descriptive statistics of
the explanatory variables used in the right-hand side of Equation
(3). Patients receiving specialised services are more likely to bemale and younger (probably mainly because infants are more likely
to require specialised activity, 16% of them at birth), to have been
cared for by more than one consultant during their hospital stay,
and to have been transferred between hospitals. As the diagnostic
characteristics were constructed using ICD10 codes, there might be
some overlap with the codes used for the deﬁnition of specialised
services. However, other than a very small correlation between
obesity and morbid obesity services, we found no correlation be-
tween the specialised services and other patient characteristics.Results
Distribution of patient costs
In order to compare the large variety of models to analyse pa-
tient costs, we undertake a quasi-experimental approach following
an approach developed by Deb and Burgess (Deb & Burgess, 2008).
We randomly split observations into two groups; half are assigned
to the estimation group and the remaining half to the prediction
group. We extract random samples with replacement of size
N ¼ {20,000 50,000 200,000 500,000 1,000,000} from the esti-
mation group. Then we estimate Equation (3) and save parameter
results for eight models. We repeat this procedure thirty times.
Finally we calculate conditional means using all the observations
from the prediction group.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables (st. dev. in parenthesis).
Variable Description Not spec Spec Tot Variable Description Not spec Spec Tot
female1 ¼1, Patient is
female
57.4 (49.5) 44.5 (49.7) 56.0 (49.6) riskfact ¼1, Patient with
other lifestyle risk
factors
0.729 (8.51) 0.265 (5.14) 0.681 (8.22)
age Patient age at
the beginning
of the spell
51.61 (24.24) 49.94 (25.70) 51.44 (24.40) congmalf ¼1, Patient with
congenital
malformations
1.13 (10.6) 4.87 (21.5) 1.51 (12.2)
urban1 ¼1, Urban area 0.818 (38.6) 0.817 (38.7) 0.818 (38.6) risk_phys ¼1, Patient
exposed to
physical risk
factors
0.064 (2.54) 0.119 (3.45) 0.07 (2.65)
white1 ¼1, ethnicity
is white
79.4 (40.4) 78.9 (40.8) 79.4 (40.4) risk_psysoc ¼1, Patient with
problems related
to psychosocial
circumstances
0.384 (6.19) 0.157 (3.95) 0.361 (6.00)
episodes Number of
episodes in
the spell
1.118 (0.426) 1.108 (0.545) 1.117 (0.440) East of
England
¼1, Region of
treatment:
East of England
8.98 (28.6) 8.23 (27.5) 8.91 (28.5)
emerg ¼1, Patient
admitted as
emergency
38.3 (48.6) 15.9 (36.6) 36 (48.0) London ¼1, Region of
treatment:
London
14.4 (35.1) 14.7 (35.4) 14.4 (35.1)
die ¼1, Patient
died
1.55 (12.4) 1.81 (13.3) 1.58 (12.5) North-East ¼1, Region of
treatment:
North-East
6.40 (24.5) 4.70 (21.2) 6.23 (24.2)
tr_in_el ¼1, Patient
transferred
from an
eligible
provider
0.004 (0.628) 0.0164 (1.28) 0.005 (0.723) North-West ¼1, Region of
treatment:
North-West
16.4 (37.0) 13.8 (34.5) 16.1 (36.8)
tr_in_nonel ¼1, Patient
transferred
from a
non-eligible
provider
2.65 (16.1) 4.14 (19.9) 2.8 (16.5) South-East ¼1, Region of
treatment:
South-East
12.7 (33.3) 13.2 (33.8) 12.7 (33.3)
tr_out_el ¼1, Patient
transferred
to an eligible
provider
0.501 (7.06) 0.491 (6.99) 0.5 (7.05) South-West ¼1, Region of
treatment:
South-West
11.2 (31.5) 12.6 (33.2) 11.3 (31.7)
tr_out_nonel ¼1, Patient
transferred to
a non-eligible
provider
1.13 (10.6) 1.35 (11.5) 1.16 (10.7) West Midlands ¼1, Region of
treatment:
West Midlands
11.2 (31.5) 12.4 (32.9) 11.3 (31.7)
pregnancy ¼1, One of the
patient
diagnosis is:
pregnancy
or childbirth
10.4 (30.6) 0.528 (7.25) 9.41 (29.2) Yorkshire ¼1, Region of
treatment:
Yorkshire
11.2 (31.6) 14.7 (35.4) 11.6 (32.0)
drug ¼1, Patient is
drug user or
drug dependent
0.324 (5.68) 0.203 (4.50) 0.312 (5.57) imd04c Index of multiple
deprivation:
crime
0.0526 (0.839) 0.0613 (0.852) 0.0535 (0.841)
alcohol ¼1, Patient is
alcohol user
or alcohol
dependent
1.7 (12.9) 0.732 (8.52) 1.6 (12.5) imd04ed Index of multiple
deprivation:
education, skills
and training
23.75 (19.82) 24.91 (20.63) 23.87 (19.91)
smoke ¼1, Patient is
tobacco user
or tobacco
dependent
3.69 (18.9) 3.48 (8.30) 3.67 (18.8) imd04hd Index of multiple
deprivation:
health
deprivation
and disability
0.129 (0.904) 0.151 (0.911) 0.131 (0.905)
obesity ¼1, Patient
with obesity
problems
0.72 (8.45) 1.4 (11.8) 0.791 (8.86) imd04hs Index of multiple
deprivation:
barriers to
housing and
services
21.26 (10.95) 21.31 (10.73) 21.26 (10.93)
allergy ¼1, Patient
with
personal
history
of allergy
2.76 (16.4) 1.91 (13.7) 2.67 (16.1) imd04i Index of multiple
deprivation:
income
deprivation
0.170 (0.128) 0.174 (0.130) 0.171 (0.128)
diabetes ¼1, Patient
with diabetes
problems
7.85 (26.9) 6.26 (24.2) 7.69 (26.6) imd04ia Index of multiple
deprivation:
income
deprivation
affecting older
people
0.214 (0.132) 0.218 (0.135) 0.214 (0.132)
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Table 2 (continued )
Variable Description Not spec Spec Tot Variable Description Not spec Spec Tot
hypertens ¼1, Patient with
hypertension
problems
17.1 (37.6) 12.1 (32.6) 16.5 (37.2) imd04ic Index of multiple
deprivation:
income
deprivation
affecting children
0.227 (0.180) 0.232 (0.183) 0.227 (0.180)
haemorr ¼1, Patient with
haemorrhage/
coagulation
problems
0.393 (6.26) 0.899 (9.44) 0.445 (6.66) imd04le Index of multiple
deprivation: living
environment
22.56 (17.30) 22.36 (17.15) 22.54 (17.29)
histdis ¼1, Patient with
personal history
of diseases
10.8 (31.0) 8.66 (28.1) 10.6 (30.7) imd04rk Index of multiple
deprivation:
overall
ranking
15100.4 (9386.3) 14882.9 (9492.0) 15077.9 (9397.5)
Notes: age expressed in years, number of episodes in units, imd variables have index-speciﬁc domains, all other variables are expressed as percentages.
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statistics that are common in this kind of analysis: a) the mean
prediction error (MPE) and b) the mean absolute prediction error
(MAPE), which measure predictive accuracy on average and for
individual observations. Results conﬁrm that, compared to the
other models, simple OLS has very good predictive performance
both on average and for individuals (Table 3). Accuracy improves as
the sample increases, but notmonotonically. Log-linear OLSmodels
are the least precise, even allowing for Duan correction factors
(Duan, Manning, Morris, & Newhouse, 1983). The FMM with two
components suffered convergence problems, particularly for the
sample of 20,000 observations. Therefore in Table 3 the average
MPE and MAPE is given by the models that achieved convergence.
In terms of performance, FMM is positioned behind linear OLS and
GLM, but is more accurate than log-linear models. Given these re-
sults, we decided to undertake the analysis on the full datawith just
a linear OLS model and a GLM with a gamma distribution and
square root link. Gamma distributions were chosen based on the
results of modiﬁed Park tests.
Specialist mark-ups
InTable 4wereport thepredictedpercentage increase in costs for
specialised services for the two equations using OLS and GLM. The
specialised markers where estimates are statistically signiﬁcant (p-
value<0.01) appear in bold. There are some general issues to note.Table 3
Average performance of competing models.
Model Statistics Estimation sample
20,000 50,000
1 MPE 0.006659 L0.004329
MAPE 0.471862 0.469603
2 MPE 2.411588 1.626989
MAPE 2.870144 2.088513
3 MPE 2.708189 1.832423
MAPE 2.881833 2.006294
4 MPE 2.138670 2.063748
MAPE 2.243711 2.166274
5 MPE 0.008342 0.005645
MAPE 0.473157 0.470833
6 MPE 0.006665 0.004370
MAPE 0.471149 0.469311
7 MPE L0.065603 0.004975
MAPE 0.532327 0.471940
8 MPE 0.400378 0.336326
MAPE 0.770003 0.707454
Notes: MPEemean prediction error; MAPEemean average prediction error. Models: 1) O
correction, 4) OLS on square root costs, 5) GLM with gamma distribution and log link, 6) G
and power 1 link, 8) FMM with 2 components.
Averages for 30 replications, except for model 8 which includes only statistics for replicati
in terms of one of the two statistics.First, the signiﬁcance of the specialist markers is consistent
across speciﬁcations. This means that we can be conﬁdent in
interpreting (i) a signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient as indicating that
the specialist marker has a signiﬁcant positive impact on cost and
(ii) a non-signiﬁcant coefﬁcient as indicating no signiﬁcant impact
of this type of specialised care on costs.
Second, for the same speciﬁcation (Equation (1) or (3)) the OLS
and GLM estimates are very similar, differing by no more than 1.25
percentage points for all but one specialist marker, infectious dis-
ease, for which GLM estimates are 3 percentage points lower. The
general consistency of results is unsurprising given the large sam-
ple sizes.
Third, for ﬁve types of specialised care, estimates of the addi-
tional costs differ by more than one percentage point when
comparing Equation (1) and the risk-adjusted Equation (3). This is
evident for specialised care for neurosciences, cystic ﬁbrosis, chil-
dren, rheumatology and vascular diseases (for which the signiﬁ-
cance level also falls from p< 0.01 to p< 0.05). This implies that the
set of patient characteristics used as risk-adjustment variables are
jointly correlated with the type of specialised care in question. For
those hospitals that provide these types of care, it will be particu-
larly important to account for these characteristics when making
judgements about relative hospital performance based on the
random effects.
The specialised services that drive higher costs relative to other
patients allocated to the same HRG are cancer (18% higher costs),200,000 500,000 1,000,000
0.003627 L0.002550 L0.002534
0.468406 0.467833 0.467753
0.874667 0.877367 0.840543
1.337236 1.340781 1.303992
0.989557 0.994005 0.952426
1.162441 1.167355 1.125775
2.010085 1.902191 1.948482
2.108399 2.002521 2.046431
0.004713 0.003663 0.003672
0.469535 0.469020 0.468967
0.003781 0.002726 0.002728
0.468381 0.467870 0.467810
L0.003580 0.003253 0.002179
0.470543 0.471467 0.470718
0.334915 0.322274 0.325995
0.685659 0.679344 0.680713
LS, 2) OLS on logged costs without Duan correction, 3) OLS on logged costs with Duan
LM with gamma distribution and square root link, 7) GLM with gamma distribution
ons where convergence has been achieved. Numbers in bold indicate the best model
Table 5
Complete model (Equation (3)), estimates of explanatory variables coefﬁcients.
OLS GLM OLS GLM
imd04c 0.000 0.021 tr_out_nonel 0.129 0.129
imd04ed 0.000 0.000 die 0.072 0.073
imd04hd 0.009 0.022 emerg 0.013 0.023
imd04hs 0.000 0.001 episodes 0.108 0.106
imd04i 0.090 0.075 East of England 0.115 0.109
imd04ia 0.047 0.104 London 0.160 0.140
imd04ic L0.078 0.014 North-East 0.022 0.033
imd04le 0.000 0.001 North-West 0.009 0.017
imd04rk 0.000 0.000 South-East 0.068 0.081
pregnancy 0.079 0.057 South-West 0.007 0.021
drug 0.001 0.009 West Midlands 0.044 0.030
alcohol L0.041 L0.051 Yorkshire 0.055 0.080
smoke 0.008 0.005 urban1 0.003 0.005
obesity 0.013 0.026 white1 0.015 0.008
allergy 0.026 0.024 female1 0.599 0.431
diabetes 0.008 0.018 male1 0.600 0.434
hypertens 0.047 0.056 age 0.085 0.070
haemorr 0.081 0.071 age2 0.002 0.002
histdis 0.020 0.020 age3 0.000 0.000
riskfact 0.001 0.012 femage 0.086 0.071
congmalf 0.051 0.058 femage2 0.002 0.002
risk_phys 0.007 0.004 femage3 0.000 0.000
risk_psysoc 0.192 0.175 malage 0.087 0.071
tr_in_el 0.008 0.012 malage2 0.002 0.002
tr_in_nonel 0.160 0.157 malage3 0.000 0.000
tr_out_el 0.140 0.122 _cons 0.260 L0.630
Notes: Bold ﬁgures 1% signiﬁcant, underlined ﬁgures 5% signiﬁcant. Clustered SE by
hospital ID. Reference category for gender is patients with unknown sex or un-
dergoing sex change.
Table 4
Estimates of additional costs associated with receipt of specialised care (%).
Equation: OLS e linear GLM e gamma family,
square root link
[1] [3] [1] [3]
Cancer 0.1842 0.1879 0.1852 0.1838
BMT 0.1045 0.0897 0.0858 0.0555
Haemophilia 0.1435 0.2022 0.1418 0.1735
Womens 0.0192 0.0157 0.0180 0.0092
Spinal 0.2755 0.2729 0.2785 0.2775
Neurosciences 0.2286 0.1691 0.2246 0.1807
Cystic ﬁbrosis 0.3792 0.3347 0.3798 0.3282
Renal 0.1117 0.0868 0.1121 0.0849
Intestinal failure 0.0017 0.0196 0.0044 0.0169
Cardiology 0.0007 0.0600 0.0002 0.0386
Cleft lip 0.0423 0.0144 0.0435 0.0069
Infectious diseases 0.2129 0.2049 0.1885 0.1700
Liver 0.0754 0.0637 0.0760 0.0631
Children 0.1997 0.1742 0.1929 0.1644
Dermatology 0.0087 0.0037 0.0092 0.0000
Rheumatology 0.1298 0.1618 0.1295 0.1754
Endocrinology 0.0071 0.0110 0.0104 0.0089
Respiratory 0.0381 0.0743 0.0409 0.0732
Vascular diseases 0.2112 0.1753 0.2032 0.1629
Pain management 0.1902 0.2200 0.1687 0.2253
Ear surgery 0.0006 0.0183 0.0007 0.0250
Colorectal 0.2105 0.2150 0.2137 0.2198
Orthopaedic 0.2130 0.2248 0.2073 0.2180
Morbid obesity 0.0075 0.0106 0.0068 0.0052
Metabolic disorders 0.0155 0.0023 0.0205 0.0198
Ophthalmology 0.0570 0.0784 0.0546 0.0802
Haemoglobinopathy 0.0031 0.0131 0.0000 0.0056
Obs. 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599
R2/Log-pseudolikelihood 0.0020 0.0080 10,317,120 9,971,890
Notes: Bold ﬁgures 1% signiﬁcant, underlined ﬁgures 5% signiﬁcant. Clustered SE by
hospital ID.
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(20%), rheumatology (13%), colorectal (21%) and orthopaedic (21%).
Compared to otherwise similar patients, those that receive speci-
alised services tend also to have longer lengths of stay, which
contributes to their higher costs. The considerably higher addi-
tional costs for specialised spinal services and cystic ﬁbrosis ser-
vices are partly a reﬂection that patients requiring these types of
care often also receive other types of specialised care (almost a
quarter of cystic ﬁbrosis and a half of spinal patients).
Table 5 reports the coefﬁcients associated with the risk-
adjustment variables for both the OLS and GLM versions of Equa-
tion (3) (the specialist markers previously reported in Table 4 are
not reported). This table shows that, compared to other patients in
the same HRG and over and above the inﬂuence of specialised care,
patients have higher costs (p < 0.01) if they are pregnant (preg-
nancy), suffer allergy (allergy), congenital malformations (con-
gmalf) or problems related to psychosocial circumstances
(risk_psysoc), were transferred between hospitals (tr_*) or con-
sultants (episodes) during their treatment, if they died in hospital,
of if they were treated in London (despite the MMF correction for
the higher costs of labour, land and buildings). Patients diagnosed
with alcohol problems have slightly lower (4e5%) costs. The rela-
tionship between cost and the deprivation of the patient’s area of
residence (imd*) is sensitive to the deprivation indicator and to the
choice of OLS and GLM but generally appears insigniﬁcant. Age does
not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on costs, probably because this is
already accounted for in the construction of HRGs.Sensitivity analyses
Our estimates are generally robust to alternative deﬁnitions of
specialised care (table of results shown in the supporting material).In particular, in sensitivity analyses we relax the condition that
patients have to be treated in eligible hospitals and we exclude
patients from the analysis if they were allocated to HRGs in which
either fewer than 10 patients did not receive specialised care or
fewer than 10 patients did receive specialised care.
In the ﬁrst case, the estimated marginal effect in both equations
is unchanged, except for spinal and children’s services, for which
we observe a reduction of ten percentage points. The difference
arises because patients receiving specialised spinal and children’s
services are not concentrated exclusively among those hospitals
deemed eligible by the Department of Health for additional pay-
ments. The lower estimates for these types of specialised care imply
that hospitals that specialise in providing these services and are
eligible for additional funding are more expensive than those that
do not specialise, all else equal.
The results are not sensitive to excluding patients in particular
HRGs, except for vascular diseases services, for which the marginal
cost becomes 7 percentage points higher, and blood and marrow
transplantation services, where the marker becomes positive and
signiﬁcant. The sensitivity of results for these two specialised ser-
vices is due to considerably fewer patients now being identiﬁed as
receiving specialised care for these services. Therefore, this implies
that the HRGs for these services are already capturing the speci-
alised nature of care for the majority of patients receiving vascular
and blood and marrow transplantation services.Hospital performance
As would be expected, the vast majority of the variance in pa-
tient costs is due to whether they receive specialised care and to
their different characteristics rather than to the hospital in which
they are treated. This is evidenced by r ¼ s2u=ðs2u þ s2ε Þ ¼ 0:017 for
the OLS Equation (3).
Nevertheless, there are differences among hospitals in the size
of their random effects, implying variation in average costs across
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Fig. 2. Ranking of random effects: OLS vs. GLM model.
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ranked according to their random effect, ordered from those with
the lowest average costs for their patients to those with the highest
average costs. Ranking is not sensitive to linear OLS and GLM forms
of the model, the correlation between the random effects for the
two versions of Equation (3) amounting to r¼ 0.99. For a handful of
hospitals there are some movements but for most hospitals the
ranking is little changed, as can be seen in Fig. 2. Deviations from
the 45 line are completely negligible at the bottom and at the top
of the rankings and minor in the middle.
We explored the relationship between each hospital’s random
effect and the extent to which it provided specialised care,
measured as the number of patients receiving specialised care as a
the proportion of total activity. We found a moderate correlation of
around 32e34% depending on the OLS or GLMmodel. We explored
this further by performing regressions for specialised vs. non-
specialised providers of children’s care. We deﬁned a hospital as
a “specialised” provider of children’s services either if more than 5%
of its care provided to children was specialised or if it deﬁnes itself
as a specialised Children’s hospital. The estimated effect for chil-
dren services is always lower for these “specialised” providers,
probably because they can better exploit economies of scale.Conclusions and discussion
We have evaluated the possibility that hospitals providing
specialised care might be ﬁnancially disadvantaged under a pro-
spective payment regime because HRGs do not account fully for the
cost implications of specialised services. Our analysis involved
calculating the additional costs associated with receipt of speci-
alised care for more than 12 million patients treated in 163 English
hospitals during 2008/9. We compared various functional forms in
terms of their ability to predict the distribution of our cost data and
found that OLS and GLM were superior to logarithmic trans-
formations and ﬁnite mixture models. The performance of OLS
relative to other models is due to a large sample size which pro-
duces unbiased estimates and precise individual predictions. Un-
surprisingly, individual predictions are better when a GLM with
gamma distribution is used for smaller samples, as this distribution
is better able to accommodate the skewed nature of the cost data.
Of course, in any empirical analysis one can question the data,
both in terms of its representativeness and accuracy. A major
strength of our study is the large sample size, consisting of almost
the entire English patient population. Nevertheless some patientswere omitted because of missing data, the main reason being an
absence of costs which was non-random across hospitals. Thus
results may be biased in an indeterminate direction. It should be
recognised, though, that this limitation applies not just to our study
but to the English reimbursement regime itself. The payments are
supposed to reﬂect the national average costs for all patients allo-
cated to the same HRG (Street &Maynard, 2007), but if the cost data
are absent from our study, they are also absent from the calculation
of the tariffs. Ultimately it is for hospitals themselves to improve
their costing and reporting processes to ensure that they are not
disadvantaged by having their patients under-represented in ana-
lyses conducted for purposes of payment design. Evaluation of
future years’ data may be more comprehensive.
Our study relies on agreed deﬁnitions of what constitute spe-
cialised care for particular types of patients. In England, there are 34
sets of deﬁnitions (SSNDS) each of which has been “approved by
the National Specialised Commissioning Group and endorsed by
the relevant professional organisations” (NHS Specialised Services,
2010c). For 27 of the SSNDS, deﬁnitions are based on diagnosis or
procedure codes which, if present in the patient’s medical record,
are said to provide a deﬁnitive indication of the receipt of speci-
alised care. Our analysis takes these deﬁnitions as given and in-
vestigates the cost consequences of patients with these diagnosis or
procedure codes. Of course, onemight question the validity of these
deﬁnitions of specialised care, in particular the use of procedural
codes given that the choice of procedure is partially a clinical de-
cision that may vary among clinicians that treat otherwise similar
patients. This criticism, however, applies equally to the construc-
tion of HRGs themselves, which are somewhat atypical among
DRG-type systems in being based on both procedure and diagnosis
codes (Kobel et al., 2011).
Our analysis suggests that, for some types of specialised care,
costs are indeed higher than for other patients allocated to the
same HRG. The implication for payment policy is that hospitals that
treat such patients might be paid an additional surcharge over and
above the payment associated with the HRG to which these pa-
tients are allocated. The size of additional surcharge might be up to
the percentage increase in costs as reported for Equation (1) in
Table 4. Implementation should be on a budget neutral basis,
involving a reallocation from the base national HRG tariffs to pay for
any surcharges to be made for specialist care.
The specialised services meriting surcharges are cancer (18%
higher payment than for other patients in the same HRG), spinal
(28%), neurosciences (23%), cystic ﬁbrosis (38%), children’s (20%),
rheumatology (13%), colorectal (21%) and orthopaedic (21%). Sur-
charges would not be made in the presence of the other specialised
care markers, there being insufﬁcient evidence to suggest that the
costs associated with these types of specialised care drive higher
costs.
While we recommend that the amount of payment reﬂects the
estimated percentage increase in costs, different values could be
adopted, justiﬁed on other grounds. These grounds may include:
transitional arrangements, notably for children’s services, where
the recommended value of 20% is substantially lower than the 78%
surcharge that applied when our analysis was commissioned
(Department of Health, 2011); materiality, where an additional top-
up would have limited ﬁnancial consequence for those types of
specialised services that are delivered to only a small number of
patients; and sensitivity to model speciﬁcation, though these
generally prove immaterial.
Our analysis also demonstrates that there is substantial varia-
tion in the average cost of treatment across the hospital sector, and
that this variation is due neither to the provision of specialised
services, and nor to the casemix, diagnostic or socio-demographic
characteristics of each hospital’s patients. After controlling for
S. Daidone, A. Street / Social Science & Medicine 84 (2013) 110e118118these diverse reasons for cost variation, we are able to rank hos-
pitals according to their relative average costs. Those hospitals
rated as relatively costly will struggle ﬁnancially under a prospec-
tive payment system.
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